MONITORING, MORAL HAZARD, ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION, AND RISK SHARING IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTING

被引：61

作者：

BARON, DP ^{[1
]}

BESANKO, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] INDIANA UNIV,BLOOMINGTON,IN 47401

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 18卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555639

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：509 / 532

页数：24

共 29 条

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