AGENT COMPENSATION AND THE LIMITS OF BONDING

被引：43

作者：

EATON, BC ^{[1
]}

WHITE, WD ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV ILLINOIS,CHICAGO,IL 60680

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1982年 / 20卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1982.tb00351.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：330 / 343

页数：14

相关论文

共 21 条

[1] [Anonymous], 1937, INQUIRY NATURE CAUSE
[2] LAW ENFORCEMENT, MALFEASANCE, AND COMPENSATION OF ENFORCERS
BECKER, GS
STIGLER, GJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 1974, 3 (01) : 1 - 18
[3] USE OF COLLATERAL TO ENFORCE DEBT CONTRACTS
BENJAMIN, DK
[J]. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 1978, 16 (03) : 333 - 359
[4] FREE COMPETITION AND OPTIMAL AMOUNT OF FRAUD
DARBY, MR
KARNI, E
[J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1973, 16 (01) : 67 - 88
[5] EATON BC, 1981, EC HIGH WAGES AGENCY
[6] GOLDBERG I, 1977, UNPUB ENFORCEMENT WO
[7] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY
HOLMSTROM, B
[J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91
[8] THEORY OF FIRM - MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
JENSEN, MC
MECKLING, WH
[J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 1976, 3 (04) : 305 - 360
[9] KAHN LR, 1966, SOCIAL PSYCHOL ORG
[10] THE ROLE OF MARKET FORCES IN ASSURING CONTRACTUAL PERFORMANCE
KLEIN, B
LEFFLER, KB
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (04) : 615 - 641