SUPPLY-SIDE AND DEMAND-SIDE COST-SHARING IN HEALTH-CARE

[21] PAULY MV, 1986, J ECON LIT, V24, P629

[22] PAULY MV, 1968, AM ECON REV, V58, P531

[23] HOSPITAL NONPRICE COMPETITION AND MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1989, 8 (02) : 147 - 172

[24] USING HOSPITAL-SPECIFIC COSTS TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS OF PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1990, 9 (03) : 237 - 251

[25] RELMAN A, 1989, TECHNOL REV, V92, P31

[26] INCENTIVES IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1991, 5 (02) : 45 - 66

[27] Schieber G J, 1992, Health Care Financ Rev, V13, P1

[28] SIEGEL C, 1991, J HLTH EC, V11, P1

[29] WEISBROD BA, 1991, J ECON LIT, V29, P523

[30] MEDICAL INSURANCE - CASE STUDY OF TRADEOFF BETWEEN RISK SPREADING AND APPROPRIATE INCENTIVES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1970, 2 (01) : 10 - 26

[21] PAULY MV, 1986, J ECON LIT, V24, P629

[22] PAULY MV, 1968, AM ECON REV, V58, P531

[23] HOSPITAL NONPRICE COMPETITION AND MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT POLICY [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1989, 8 (02) : 147 - 172

[24] USING HOSPITAL-SPECIFIC COSTS TO IMPROVE THE FAIRNESS OF PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 1990, 9 (03) : 237 - 251

[25] RELMAN A, 1989, TECHNOL REV, V92, P31

[26] INCENTIVES IN PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 1991, 5 (02) : 45 - 66

[27] Schieber G J, 1992, Health Care Financ Rev, V13, P1

[28] SIEGEL C, 1991, J HLTH EC, V11, P1

[29] WEISBROD BA, 1991, J ECON LIT, V29, P523

[30] MEDICAL INSURANCE - CASE STUDY OF TRADEOFF BETWEEN RISK SPREADING AND APPROPRIATE INCENTIVES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1970, 2 (01) : 10 - 26