EQUILIBRIUM IN A SYSTEM OF COMMUNITIES WITH LOCAL PUBLIC-GOODS - DIAGRAMMATIC EXPOSITION

被引：14

作者：

BRUECKNER, JK

机构：

[1] University of Illinois, Urbana

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1979年 / 2卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(79)90055-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Equilibrium community configurations are analysed using a simple model where a community's public good output is chosen by majority voting and financed by a head tax. Examples which contradict the Tiebout hypothesis are presented. © 1979.

引用

页码：387 / 393

页数：7

共 5 条

[1] GROUP SEGREGATION AND OPTIMAL JURISDICTIONS [J].

MCGUIRE, M .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1974, 82 (01) :112-132

[2]

Stiglitz J. E., 1977, EC PUBLIC SERVICES

[3] A PURE THEORY OF LOCAL EXPENDITURES [J].

TIEBOUT, CM .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1956, 64 (05) :416-424

[4] EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIES WITH A LOCAL PUBLIC GOOD [J].

WESTHOFF, F .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1977, 14 (01) :84-112

[5]

WHEATON W, 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P377, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90012-2

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