Sales maximization and specific human capital

被引：17

作者：

Zabojnik, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Queens Univ, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1998年 / 29卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2556094

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Profit-maximizing owners of firms may find it optimal to provide managers with incentives to maximize sales in addition to profits. This influences the outcome of the bargaining game between workers and managers over workers' wages and helps to solve the problem of underinvestment by workers in specific human capital. I investigate optimal managerial contracts from this point of view and show that the optimal contract is a function of scales in addition to profits.

引用

页码：790 / 802

页数：13

共 28 条

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