OPTIMAL AUDITING, INSURANCE, AND REDISTRIBUTION

被引：211

作者：

MOOKHERJEE, D ^{[1
]}

PNG, I ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF LOS ANGELES,LOS ANGELES,CA 90024

来源：

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 104卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2937855

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：399 / 415

页数：17

共 12 条

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