NUMERICAL-ANALYSIS OF ASYMMETRIC 1ST PRICE AUCTIONS

被引：105

作者：

MARSHALL, RC

MEURER, MJ

RICHARD, JF

STROMQUIST, W

机构：

[1] UNIV PITTSBURGH,DEPT ECON,PITTSBURGH,PA 15260

[2] WAGNER ASSOCIATES,PAOLI,PA 19301

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1994年 / 7卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1006/game.1994.1045

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.

引用

页码：193 / 220

页数：28

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