TIME CONSISTENCY OF MONETARY-POLICY IN THE OPEN-ECONOMY

被引:8
作者
BOHN, H
机构
[1] The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-1996(91)90021-W
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that in an open economy time-consistency problems are created not only by nominal government debt, but also by nominal private debt to foreigners. Given any external nominal debt, inflation redistributes wealth between domestic residents and foreigners. A government that cares about the welfare of its residents will be tempted to inflate whenever it or its residents have issued nominal debt to foreigners. An analysis of the U.S. net investment position shows that these international considerations have become increasingly relevant for the United States, because the recent external deficits have largely been financed in nominal terms. © 1991.
引用
收藏
页码:249 / 266
页数:18
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