A SIMPLER MECHANISM THAT STOPS AGENTS FROM CHEATING

被引:12
作者
GLOVER, J
机构
[1] Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1994.1012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This note considers a principal-multi-agent model of a firm subject to adverse selection. With just the usual optimal (incentive-constrained) contracts being offered, there exist multiple (Bayes-Nash) equilibria in the agents' subgame. Moreover, from the agents' perspective, there exists an equilibrium that Pareto-dominates the equilibrium desired by the principal. By exploiting the structure of the model, this note develops a new approach for eliminating unwanted equilibria (while retaining the desired equilibrium). The approach, when compared to existing approaches, employs a simpler mechanism (one with a smaller message space) and makes weaker assumptions about the agents' behavior. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 229
页数:9
相关论文
共 12 条