STOPPING AGENTS FROM CHEATING

[1] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[2] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1984, 33 (01) : 152 - 171

[3] INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS AND BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINTS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1988, 44 (01) : 156 - 167

[4] Laffont JJ, 1982, ADV EC THEORY, P31

[5] MA C, 1986, STICERD DP86135 LOND

[6] MA C, 1988, IN PRESS REV EC STUD, V55

[7] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MANY AGENTS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 433 - 446

[8] PALFREY T, 1987, REV ECON STUD, V56, P193

[9] PALFREY T, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[10] IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION ECONOMIES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 14 - 33

[1] IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL CHOICE RULES - SOME GENERAL RESULTS ON INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1979, 46 (02) : 185 - 216

[2] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1984, 33 (01) : 152 - 171

[3] INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS AND BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINTS [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1988, 44 (01) : 156 - 167

[4] Laffont JJ, 1982, ADV EC THEORY, P31

[5] MA C, 1986, STICERD DP86135 LOND

[6] MA C, 1988, IN PRESS REV EC STUD, V55

[7] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MANY AGENTS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1984, 51 (03) : 433 - 446

[8] PALFREY T, 1987, REV ECON STUD, V56, P193

[9] PALFREY T, IN PRESS ECONOMETRIC

[10] IMPLEMENTATION IN DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION ECONOMIES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1986, 39 (01) : 14 - 33