INCENTIVE SCHEMES WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS AND BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINTS

被引：33

作者：

DEMSKI, JS

SAPPINGTON, DEM

SPILLER, PT

机构：

[1] BELL COMMUN RES,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960

[2] STANFORD UNIV,HOOVER INST,STANFORD,CA 94305

[3] UNIV ILLINOIS,CHAMPAIGN,IL 61820

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1988年 / 44卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(88)90100-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：156 / 167

页数：12

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DEMSKI, JS ;

SAPPINGTON, D .

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[7] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J].

SAPPINGTON, D .

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[8]

STIGLITZ JE, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P393

[9]

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