OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS

被引：177

作者：

DEMSKI, JS ^{[1
]}

SAPPINGTON, D ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,DEPT ECON,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1984年 / 33卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(84)90045-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：152 / 171

页数：20

相关论文

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