BUSINESS UNIT INNOVATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION

被引：93

作者：

HOLTHAUSEN, RW ^{[1
]}

LARCKER, DF ^{[1
]}

SLOAN, RG ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,WHARTON SCH,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 19卷 / 2-3期

关键词：

MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION; DIVISIONAL INNOVATION; DIVISIONAL COMPENSATION CONTRACTS;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4101(94)00385-I

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We examine whether the structure of compensation for the divisional CEO is related to subsequent innovative activity within the division, and whether the divisional CEO's compensation is structured as a function of the expected innovation opportunity set facing the division. Both the expected innovation opportunity set and the divisional executive's compensation contract are treated as endogenous variables by adopting a simultaneous equation approach. We find modest evidence that the proportion of total compensation tied to long-term components has a positive relation with future innovation, but no evidence that this proportion has a positive relation with the expected innovation opportunity set.

引用

页码：279 / 313

页数：35

共 41 条

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