COOPERATION IN AN ASYMMETRIC VOLUNTEERS DILEMMA GAME - THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE

被引:85
作者
DIEKMANN, A
机构
[1] Institute of Sociology, University of Berne, Berne 9, CH-3000
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01245571
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The symmetric Volunteer's dilemma game (VOD) models a situation in which each of N actors faces the decision of either producing a step-level collective good (action ''C'') or freeriding (''D''). One player's cooperative action suffices for producing the collective good. Unilateral cooperation yields a payoff U for D-players and U-K for the cooperative player(s). However, if all actors decide for ''freeriding'', each player's payoff is zero (U>K>0). In this article, an essential modification is discussed. In an asymmetric VOD, the interest in the collective good and/or the production costs (i.e. U or K) may vary between actors. The generalized asymmetric VOD is similar to market entry games. Alternative hypotheses about the behaviour of subjects are derived from a game-theoretical analysis. They are investigated in an experimental setting. The application of the mixed Nash-equilibrium concept yields a rather counter-intuitive prediction which apparently contradicts the empirical data. The predictions of the Harsanyi-Selten-theory and Schelling's ''focal point theory'' are in better accordance with the data. However, they do not account for the ''diffusion-of-responsibility-effect'' also observable in the context of an asymmetric VOD game.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 85
页数:11
相关论文
共 13 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2016, SELFISH GENE
[2]  
Brennan G., 1984, J APPL PHILOS, V1, P151
[3]   BYSTANDER INTERVENTION IN EMERGENCIES - DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY [J].
DARLEY, JM ;
LATANE, B .
JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 1968, 8 (4P1) :377-&
[4]   VOLUNTEERS DILEMMA [J].
DIEKMANN, A .
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1985, 29 (04) :605-610
[5]  
DIEKMANN A, 1986, PARADOXICAL EFFECTS
[6]  
HARSANYI JC, 1988, GENERAL THEORY EQUIL
[7]   THE UNPROFITABILITY OF MIXED-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN 2 PERSON GAMES - A 2ND FOLK-THEOREM [J].
HOLLER, MJ .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1990, 32 (04) :319-323
[8]  
Olson M., 1965, LOGIC COLLECTIVE ACT
[9]  
Schelling Thomas C., 1980, STRATEGY CONFLICT
[10]  
Selten R., 1982, GAMES EC DYNAMICS TI, P101