LEARNING HOW TO COOPERATE - OPTIMAL PLAY IN REPEATED COORDINATION GAMES

被引：165

作者：

CRAWFORD, VP ^{[1
]}

HALLER, H ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] VIRGINIA POLYTECH INST & STATE UNIV, DEPT ECON, BLACKSBURG, VA 24061 USA

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1990年 / 58卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938191

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：571 / 595

页数：25

共 26 条

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