THE BARGAINING PROBLEM WITHOUT CONVEXITY - EXTENDING THE EGALITARIAN AND KALAI-SMORODINSKY SOLUTIONS

被引：38

作者：

CONLEY, JP ^{[1
]}

WILKIE, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BELL COMMUN RES INC,MORRISTOWN,NJ 07960

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1991年 / 36卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(91)90199-U

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We relax the assumption used in axiomatic bargaining theory that the feasible set be convex. Instead we require only that it be 7 comprehensive. We show that on this domain, Kalai's (1977) characterization of the egalitarian solution remains true, as does Kalai and Smorodinsky's (1975) theorem if we use weak Pareto optimality. © 1991.

引用

页码：365 / 369

页数：5

共 9 条

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