WHY DEMOCRACIES PRODUCE EFFICIENT RESULTS

[1] ALESINA A, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P796

[2] THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRMS IN A REGULATED ENVIRONMENT - THE CASE OF UNITED-STATES ELECTRIC UTILITIES [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1986, 29 (03) : 281 - 294

[3] A THEORY OF COMPETITION AMONG PRESSURE GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (03) : 371 - 400

[4] PUBLIC POLICIES, PRESSURE GROUPS, AND DEAD WEIGHT COSTS [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 28 (03) : 329 - 347

[5] BORCHERDING T.E., 1982, Z NATIONALOKON S, P127

[6] THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) : 1 - 44

[7] Converse P. E., 1980, AM SOCIAL ATTITUDES

[8] ELECTIONS AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 50 (1-3) : 27 - 91

[9] DEMSETZ H, 1982, DEVRIES LECTURES EC

[10] LEGISLATORS AND INTEREST-GROUPS - HOW UNORGANIZED INTERESTS GET REPRESENTED [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (01) : 89 - 106

[1] ALESINA A, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P796

[2] THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRMS IN A REGULATED ENVIRONMENT - THE CASE OF UNITED-STATES ELECTRIC UTILITIES [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1986, 29 (03) : 281 - 294

[3] A THEORY OF COMPETITION AMONG PRESSURE GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (03) : 371 - 400

[4] PUBLIC POLICIES, PRESSURE GROUPS, AND DEAD WEIGHT COSTS [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1985, 28 (03) : 329 - 347

[5] BORCHERDING T.E., 1982, Z NATIONALOKON S, P127

[6] THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST [J]. JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1960, 3 (OCT) : 1 - 44

[7] Converse P. E., 1980, AM SOCIAL ATTITUDES

[8] ELECTIONS AND INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1986, 50 (1-3) : 27 - 91

[9] DEMSETZ H, 1982, DEVRIES LECTURES EC

[10] LEGISLATORS AND INTEREST-GROUPS - HOW UNORGANIZED INTERESTS GET REPRESENTED [J]. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (01) : 89 - 106