STRONG STABILITY AND EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES WITH 2 TYPES OF PLAYERS

被引：3

作者：

CRESSMAN, R ^{[1
]}

DASH, AT ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV GUELPH, DEPT MATH & STAT, GUELPH N1G 2W1, ONTARIO, CANADA

来源：

JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY | 1991年 / 30卷 / 01期

关键词：

DYNAMIC STABILITY; FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT EVOLUTION;

D O I：

10.1007/BF00168009

中图分类号：

Q [生物科学];

学科分类号：

07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;

摘要：

Static ESS conditions are developed for the frequency evolution of a two-species haploid system by analyzing the stability of the corresponding dynamics for two pairs of strategies. A dynamic strong stability concept is introduced and shown to be equivalent to the ESS conditions in all cases where a regularity assumption is satisfied.

引用

页码：89 / 99

页数：11

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