LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND THE ECONOMIC-THEORY OF POLITICS

被引：32

作者：

COATES, D ^{[1
]}

MUNGER, M ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV N CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL, NC USA

来源：

SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL | 1995年 / 61卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1061003

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：861 / 872

页数：12

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