MODELING FINITELY-REPEATED GAMES WITH UNCERTAIN TERMINATION

[1] BASU K, 1985, STRATEGIC IRRATIONAL

[2] FINITELY REPEATED GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 905 - 922

[3] RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (04) : 1007 - 1028

[4] BINMORE K, 1985, CARESS8536 U PENNS W

[5] COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN FINITE-HORIZON NONCOOPERATIVE SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1985, 35 (02) : 390 - 398

[6] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[7] RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE PROBLEM OF PERFECTION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (04) : 1029 - 1050

[8] RENY P, 1985, RATIONALITY COMMON K

[9] SCHICK F, 1983, HAVING REASONS

[10] CHAIN STORE PARADOX [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1978, 9 (02) : 127 - 159

[1] BASU K, 1985, STRATEGIC IRRATIONAL

[2] FINITELY REPEATED GAMES [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) : 905 - 922

[3] RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (04) : 1007 - 1028

[4] BINMORE K, 1985, CARESS8536 U PENNS W

[5] COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA IN FINITE-HORIZON NONCOOPERATIVE SUPERGAMES [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1985, 35 (02) : 390 - 398

[6] RATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 245 - 252

[7] RATIONALIZABLE STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND THE PROBLEM OF PERFECTION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1984, 52 (04) : 1029 - 1050

[8] RENY P, 1985, RATIONALITY COMMON K

[9] SCHICK F, 1983, HAVING REASONS

[10] CHAIN STORE PARADOX [J]. THEORY AND DECISION, 1978, 9 (02) : 127 - 159