RENEGOTIATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA

被引：77

作者：

VANDAMME, E

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90111-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：206 / 217

页数：12

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