MAJORITY AND POSITIONAL VOTING IN A PROBABILISTIC FRAMEWORK

被引:35
作者
BARBERA, S
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2297058
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
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页码:379 / 389
页数:11
相关论文
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[No title captured]