“旋转门”影响证券监管执法吗?

被引：5

作者：

习超 ^{[1
]}

曹宁 ^{[1
]}

龚浩川 ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] 香港中文大学法律学院

[2] 北京大学法学院

来源：

清华法学 | 2018年 / 12卷 / 04期

关键词：

证券监管; 执法; 旋转门; 监管俘获; 实证;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

D922.287 [证券管理法令];

学科分类号：

030103 ;

摘要：

证券监管者与被监管者之间的"旋转门"是否影响证券监管执法的公正和有效性?本研究基于我国2004年至2016年证券监管执法大样本数据,使用定量实证研究方法,检验证券监管机构人员离任后进入上市公司担任董事、监事、高管职务对证券监管执法行为和结果的影响。实证结果显示,整体而言,"旋转门"对证券监管执法力度和刚度并无显著影响。同时,在外部制度变迁的影响下,2014年至2016年期间,"旋转门"产生了反预期性的效果,涉及"旋转门"的上市公司反而承受更为严厉的监管执法后果。

引用

页码：7 / 22

页数：16

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