控股股东控制权、产权性质与审计师选聘

被引:2
作者
许国艺
机构
[1] 天津财经大学商学院
关键词
控股股东控制权; 产权性质; 选聘权配置; 审计委托权;
D O I
10.19327/j.cnki.zuaxb.1007-9734.2017.03.u02
中图分类号
F239.4 [各类审计]; F832.51 [];
学科分类号
1202 ; 120201 ; 1201 ; 020204 ;
摘要
不同的审计师选聘权配置将影响注册会计师的独立性。控股股东是否会与审计委员争夺审计师选聘权以获取信息优势?不同产权性质企业面临的审计需求差异和投票权的差异是否会影响审计师的选聘权安排?研究发现,控股股东会利用股东控制权侵占审计委员会审计师选聘权;股东控制权对审计委员会审计师选聘权的侵占在国有企业显著而在非国有企业并不显著;股东投票控制权的大小对不同产权性质的上市公司审计师选聘权的行使会产生不同的影响。
引用
收藏
页码:55 / 69
页数:15
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