基于多任务委托代理的业主与承包商激励模型

被引：47

作者：

陈勇强

傅永程

华冬冬

机构：

[1] 天津大学管理与经济学部

来源：

管理科学学报 | 2016年 / 04期

关键词：

工程项目; 多任务; 委托代理理论; 激励模型;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F270 [企业经济理论和方法];

学科分类号：

1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

基于多任务委托代理并结合工程项目特点,以拓展型Cobb-Douglas生产函数反映工期、成本和质量多任务努力投入情况下工程项目的产出,构建了业主与承包商激励模型.结果表明,承包商在工期、成本和质量任务上的最优努力水平与综合技术水平正相关,与各自任务的边际努力成本变化率负相关;业主对承包商的最优激励系数一方面受承包商自身因素影响,包括承包商的综合技术水平、绝对风险规避度以及边际努力成本变化率,另一方面取决于项目不同任务的重要性及所处环境的不确定性.研究结果有助于业主选择适当的激励强度并实现合理的风险分担.

引用

页码：45 / 55

页数：11

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