共 12 条
[1]
Moral hazard and observability. Holmstrom B. The Bell Journal of Economics . 1979
[2]
Rank order contracts for a principal with many agents. Malcomson J. The Review of Economic Studies . 1986
[3]
Do tournaments have incentives?. Ehrenberg R G,Bognanno M L. Journal of Politics . 1990
[4]
Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Lazear E P,Rosen S. Journal of Politics . 1981
[5]
Studies on the theory of contract compensation. Luo P L. Post -Doctoral Research Report . Hanover : Tuck School at Dartmouth College . 1999
[6]
A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Green J R,Stokey N L. Journal of Politics . 1983
[7]
Top executive pay: tournament or team work?. Main B G M,et al. Journal of Labor Economics . 1993
[8]
On the efficiency of the rank order contract under moral hazard and adverse selection. Yun J. Journal of Labor Economics . 1997
[10]
Economic contests: comparative reward schemes. O’ Keeffe M,Viscusi W K,Zeckhauser R J. Journal of Labor Economics . 1984