常见拍卖形式的均衡出价策略及其特征

被引:1
作者
龙永红 [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] 武汉大学高级研究中心
[2] 中国人民大学信息学院
关键词
等价拍卖; 均衡策略; 风险中性; 鞅;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F713.359 [拍卖]; F224 [经济数学方法];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070104 ;
摘要
对一个拍卖形式的各种性质和特征的分析都建立在我们对其中的竞价者行为的分析以及对均衡结果得了解的基础上。然而,在多数情形下,拍卖的均衡没有显式表示,但在风险中性的假设下,买者的期望报酬是可加的,它是期望收入和期望支出的差,这种拟线性结构为求解拍卖的均衡策略带来极大的方便,事实上在多数情形下我们能够得到解析解,关于拍卖理论的核心结论也大多建立在风险中性的假设下。本文的目标是对各种拍卖中及其在不同的假设和限制下竞价者的出价行为以及均衡结果进行归纳和总结。
引用
收藏
页码:82 / 86
页数:5
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