Asymmetric auctions with resale

被引：78

作者：

Hafalir, Isa ^{[1
]}

Krishna, Vijay ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Tepper Sch Business, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA

[2] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2008年 / 98卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1257/aer.98.1.87

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing-the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded.

引用

页码：87 / 112

页数：26

共 24 条

[1] Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information [J].