First price auctions with resale

被引：48

作者：

Gupta, M

Lebrun, B

机构：

[1] Univ Laval, Dept Econ, St Foy, PQ G1K 7P4, Canada

[2] Northwestern Univ, JL Kellogg Grad Sch Management, Dept Managerial Econ & Decis Sci, Evanston, IL 60208 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1999年 / 64卷 / 02期

关键词：

asymmetry; first price auction; resale;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00063-4

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We present a simple model of first price auction with two bidders whose valuations are not identically distributed and where resale is possible between the bidders and given an explicit expression for the equilibrium strategies. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：181 / 185

页数：5

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[2]

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[3]

GUPTA M, 1998, WORKING PAPER SERIES, V9808

[4]

HAILE PA, 1997, UNPUB AUCT PRIV UNC

[5]

HAILE PA, 1996, UNPUB AUCT RES

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Lebrun, B .

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1999, 40 (01) :125-142

[7]

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[9]

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Mcafee, R. Preston ;

Vincent, Daniel ;

Williams, Michael A. ;

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