Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

被引：28

作者：

Fibich, G

Gavious, A

Sela, A

机构：

[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

[2] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Mat Sci, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel

[3] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Fac Engn Sci, Dept Ind Engn & Management, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2004年 / 115卷 / 02期

关键词：

asymmetric auctions; revenue equivalence; perturbation analysis;

D O I：

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：309 / 321

页数：13

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