家族企业双重委托代理与CEO薪酬激励

被引：1

作者：

陈家田 ^{[1
,2
]}

唐德善 ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] 河海大学商学院

[2] 安徽大学商学院

来源：

学术界 | 2013年 / 11期

关键词：

家族企业; CEO薪酬; 双重委托代理;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F276.5 [私营企业]; F272.92 [人事管理];

学科分类号：

摘要：

家族企业不仅存在所有者与管理层的第一重代理关系,亦存在控股家族与小股东间的第二重代理关系。CEO薪酬激励作为公司治理机制之一,必然对此有所反映。本文立足代理理论和管理理论视角,以非家族企业CEO的薪酬作为比较基准,探讨了双重委托代理问题对CEO薪酬的影响,同时也阐述了家族企业独立董事、机构投资者对CEO薪酬的影响效应。最后,对研究进行了评述并讨论了未来的研究方向。

引用

页码：97 / 100+102 +102-103

页数：7

共 15 条

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