终极所有权与企业边界——理论和来自汽车行业的证据

被引:1
作者
郑筱婷 [1 ]
王珺 [2 ,3 ,4 ]
机构
[1] 暨南大学产业经济研究院
[2] 中山大学岭南学院
[3] 中山大学高等社会科学研究院
[4] 广东省社会科学院
关键词
终极所有权; 企业边界; 汽车; 发动机;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F426.471 []; F224 [经济数学方法];
学科分类号
020205 ; 0202 ; 0701 ; 070104 ;
摘要
本文研究企业终极所有权的性质及其结构对企业纵向边界的影响。作为国有产权事实上的终极所有者——政府比自然人所有者更偏好企业规模的增长。纵向一体化是企业不需要具备效率优势也能扩大规模的战略,故国有终极所有权比重越高,企业越倾向于纵向一体化。本文建立了数理模型验证了国有企业倾向于自制更多种类的零部件和自制更大比例某种零部件。本文用乘用车企业汽车发动机的"自制抑或外购"的数据,乘用车企业终极所有权结构的资料,验证了汽车企业发动机的自制决策与企业的国有终极产权比重正相关。同时,本文也验证了国有终极所有权比例对企业零部件的自制比率有显著的正向影响。
引用
收藏
页码:3 / 17
页数:15
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