股票流动性、股权治理与国有企业绩效

被引：22

作者：

温军

冯根福

机构：

[1] 西安交通大学经济与金融学院

来源：

经济学(季刊) | 2021年 / 21卷 / 04期

关键词：

股票流动性; 股权治理; 国有企业绩效;

D O I：

10.13821/j.cnki.ceq.2021.04.09

中图分类号：

F832.51 []; F276.1 [国有企业经济]; F272.5 [经济评价];

学科分类号：

摘要：

本文从金融市场微观结构视角,考察了中国上市公司股票流动性对国有企业绩效的作用机制和影响效果。结果发现:(1)中国资本市场股票流动性的提高有助于机构投资者低成本进入企业和国有大股东有效减持股份,显著优化公司的股权结构,降低国有企业的双重委托代理成本,提高国有上市企业的短期绩效和长期价值;(2)股票流动性对竞争性国企和中央国企的公司价值提升作用强于特定功能类和公共服务类以及地方国企。

引用

页码：1301 / 1322

页数：22

共 31 条

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