汽车保险市场中存在道德风险吗?——来自动态续保数据的分析

被引:18
作者
赵桂芹
吴洪
机构
[1] 上海财经大学
关键词
道德风险; 动机效应; 正向选择;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F842.6 [各种类型保险];
学科分类号
摘要
我们采用我国机动车辆商业三责险市场中的动态续保数据,通过两年的保单选择对投保人进行分组,合理控制风险异质性对道德风险动机效应的影响,利用Logistic回归模型(参数方法)和条件相关模型(非参数方法),研究我国汽车保险市场中是否存在道德风险以及其他动机效应。研究结果表明,投保车辆保额提高组不存在明显的道德风险证据;投保车辆保额降低组,在保额下降后观察到显著的索赔概率降低,有显著的道德风险动机效应。同时,保额降低组投保人在购买不计免赔率特约条款的情况下,还存在正向选择的情形。
引用
收藏
页码:175 / 188
页数:14
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