人工智能法律主体资格之否定

被引:16
作者
杨志航
机构
[1] 吉林大学法学院
关键词
法律主体; 人格; 康德; 自在目的; 尊严;
D O I
10.16823/j.cnki.10-1281/d.2022.04.010
中图分类号
D923 [民法];
学科分类号
030105 ;
摘要
当前,关于人工智能是否具备法律主体资格这一问题的讨论席卷整个法学界。占据学界主流的赞同说认为,基于社会的需要,应该将人工智能建构为法律上的主体。然而,这种建构却忽略了法律主体的本质。否定说虽然对此提出了批评,但又过于强调法律主体的生物人属性,错误地将法律主体等同于自然人。据此,以康德的尊严学说为视角,重新对人工智能法律主体资格进行审视,进而可得出人格尊严是法律主体的核心内涵。法律主体作为彰显尊严的人格,必须具备三个要件:第一,具有普遍必然性;第二,作为自在目的本身;第三,作为自我立法的守法者。人工智能只有符合这三个要件,方能具备法律主体资格。
引用
收藏
页码:83 / 98
页数:16
相关论文
共 45 条
  • [21] Autonomous Reboot: Kant, the categorical imperative, and contemporary challenges for machine ethicists[J] . Jeffrey White.AI & SOCIETY . 2021 (prep)
  • [22] The Extension of Legal Personhood in Artificial Intelligence[J] . Revista de Bioética y Derecho . 2019 (46)
  • [23] Ethics, Human Rights, the Intelligent Robot, and its Subsystem for Moral Beliefs[J] . Erik Sandewall.International Journal of Social Robotics . 2019 (prep)
  • [24] Can artificial intelligences be moral agents?[J] . Bartosz Bro?ek,Bartosz Janik.New Ideas in Psychology . 2018
  • [25] Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic persons[J] . Joanna J. Bryson,Mihailis E. Diamantis,Thomas D. Grant.Artificial Intelligence and Law . 2017 (3)
  • [26] Artificial moral agents are infeasible with foreseeable technologies
    Hew, Patrick Chisan
    [J]. ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, 2014, 16 (03) : 197 - 206
  • [27] Free will - even for robots[J] . John McCarthy.Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence . 2010 (3)
  • [28] A Challenge for Machine Ethics
    Tonkens, Ryan
    [J]. MINDS AND MACHINES, 2009, 19 (03) : 421 - 438
  • [29] Machine morality: bottom-up and top-down approaches for modelling human moral faculties[J] . Wallach,Wendell,Allen,Colin,Smit,Iva.AI & Society . 2008 (4)
  • [30] Prospects for a kantian machine
    Powers, Thomas M.
    [J]. IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS, 2006, 21 (04) : 46 - 51