Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

被引：4

作者：

Blume, A ^{[1
]}

Arnold, T

机构：

[1] Univ Pittsburgh, Dept Econ, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

[2] Univ Hohenheim, Dept Econ, D-70593 Stuttgart, Germany

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2004年 / 46卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

game theory; language; learning; communication; information transmission; cheap talk; evolution; meaning; incentive alignment;

D O I：

10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.

引用

页码：240 / 259

页数：20

共 22 条

[1]

[Anonymous], ECONOMETRICA, DOI DOI 10.2307/2951778

[2] Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games [J].