European Corporate Governance: a Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance

被引:23
作者
Cicon, James E. [1 ]
Ferris, Stephen P. [1 ]
Kammel, Armin J.
Noronha, Gregory [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Missouri, Trulaske Coll Business, Columbia, MO 65201 USA
[2] Univ Washington, Tacoma, WA 98402 USA
关键词
governance; convergence; legal regimes; G30; G34; LATENT SEMANTIC ANALYSIS; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; CONVERGENCE; LAW; DETERMINANTS; OWNERSHIP; DIVERSITY; CULTURE; REFORMS; HISTORY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00542.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Using Latent Semantic Analysis techniques to analyse the corporate governance codes of 23 EU nations, we obtain a number of new findings regarding their thematic content, variability, and convergence. We determine that these codes can be decomposed into five common themes, with substantial cross-sectional variability in their relative importance. We also find that the themes contained in these codes cluster in ways that are not fully consistent with the legal regime classifications of , leading us to construct two new country clusters. We further discover that the identity of the code issuer (e.g., government versus stock exchange) is important in explaining a code's primary theme as well as changes in theme prominence over time. Finally, we fail to find evidence of an unchecked thematic convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance, with some code themes converging to UK practices while others diverge.
引用
收藏
页码:620 / 648
页数:29
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