Constitutional structure and judicial deference to agency interpretations of agency rules

被引：230

作者：

Manning, JF

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1123259

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：612 / 696

页数：85

共 203 条

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