Governance and innovation

被引:109
作者
Becker-Blease, John R. [1 ]
机构
[1] Oregon State Univ, Coll Business, Corvallis, OR 97371 USA
关键词
Governance; Innovation; Antitakeover provisions; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP; MARKET; POISON; BOARDS; DETERMINANTS; ENTRENCHMENT; INDUSTRY; EQUITY; COSTS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
I examine the relation between the presence of governance provisions and corporate innovation for a sample of firms between 1984 and 1997. I find a positive relation between four proxies for innovation and the broad Gompers. Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Index. However, in subsample analyses. I find that only those provisions that officers and directors actively adopt are positively related to innovation; coverage by state-level antitakeover legislation is typically unassociated or negatively associated with innovation. The evidence suggests that it is the visibility of officers and directors' actions rather than the potency of the takeover protection that best explains the observed pattern. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:947 / 958
页数:12
相关论文
共 51 条
[1]   Competition and innovation: An inverted-U relationship [J].
Aghion, P ;
Bloom, N ;
Blundell, R ;
Griffith, R ;
Howitt, P .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2005, 120 (02) :701-728
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2001, NBER PATENT CITATION
[3]  
ATANASSOV J, 2008, DO HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
[4]   Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control [J].
Bates, Thomas W. ;
Becher, David A. ;
Lemmon, Michael L. .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2008, 87 (03) :656-677
[5]   Entrepreneurial enterprises, large established firms and other components of the free-market growth machine [J].
Baumol, WJ .
SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS, 2004, 23 (01) :9-21
[6]   The costs of entrenched boards [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Cohen, A .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2005, 78 (02) :409-433
[7]   Firms' decisions where to incorporate [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Cohen, A .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 2003, 46 (02) :383-425
[8]   The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: Theory, evidence, and policy [J].
Bebchuk, LA ;
Coates, JC ;
Subramanian, G .
STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 2002, 54 (05) :887-951
[9]   What Matters in Corporate Governance? [J].
Bebchuk, Lucian ;
Cohen, Alma ;
Ferrell, Allen .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2009, 22 (02) :783-827
[10]   RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND INTRA-INDUSTRY SPILLOVERS - AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF DYNAMIC DUALITY [J].
BERNSTEIN, JI ;
NADIRI, MI .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1989, 56 (02) :249-269