Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review

被引：158

作者：

Eckbo, B. Espen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Tuck Sch Business Dartmouth, Hanover, NH 03755 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2009年 / 15卷 / 01期

关键词：

Takeover; Merger; Tender offer; Auction; Offer premium; Bidder gains; Toeholds; Overbidding; Markups; Hostility; Method of payment; Fire-sale discounts; Bankruptcy; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE-CONTROL; TENDER OFFERS; BANKRUPTCY AUCTIONS; HORIZONTAL MERGERS; ABNORMAL RETURNS; AGENCY COSTS; MARKET; FIRMS; STOCK;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

I review recent empirical research documenting offer premiums and bidding strategies in corporate takeovers. The discussion ranges from optimal auction bidding to the choice of deal payment form and premium effects of poison pills. The evidence describes the takeover process at a detailed level, from initial premiums to bid jumps, entry of rival bidders, and toehold strategies. Cross-sectional tests illuminate whether bidders properly adjust for winner's curse, whether target stock price runups force offer price markups, and whether auctions of bankrupt firms result in fire-sale discounts. The evidence is suggestive of rational strategic bidding behavior in specific contexts. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. Ali rights reserved.

引用

页码：149 / 178

页数：30

共 180 条

[61] Bidding with securities: Auctions and security design [J].