Restricting CEO pay

被引：59

作者：

Dittmann, Ingolf ^{[1
]}

Maug, Ernst ^{[2
]}

Zhang, Dan ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Erasmus Univ, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands

[2] Univ Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2011年 / 17卷 / 04期

关键词：

Executive compensation; Caps on pay; Loss aversion; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.007

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1200 / 1220

页数：21

共 47 条

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