A more general theory of commodity bundling

被引：56

作者：

Armstrong, Mark ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Oxford OX1 3UL, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2013年 / 148卷 / 02期

关键词：

Price discrimination; Bundling; Discrete choice; Oligopoly; Common agency; OLIGOPOLY; MONOPOLY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper discusses the incentive to bundle when consumer valuations are non-additive and/or when products are supplied by separate sellers. Whether integrated or separate, a firm has an incentive to introduce a bundle discount when demand for the bundle is more elastic than the overall demand for products. When separate sellers coordinate on a bundle discount, they can use the discount to relax competition, which can harm welfare. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：448 / 472

页数：25

共 17 条

[1] COMMODITY BUNDLING AND BURDEN OF MONOPOLY [J].