Compensation principle in repeated games

被引:31
作者
Chen, KP
机构
[1] Inst. for Social Sci. and Philosophy, Academia Sinica
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1996.0071
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A behavioral refinement of subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games is proposed. A temporal deviation-free equilibrium requires that an equilibrium should not assign an action profile from which a unilateral deviation can make all the players better off at that stage. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs and give a simple algorithm to find it. An extension of it, compensating equilibrium, requires that an equilibrium should leave no room for the possibility that a multishot unilateral deviation can make all the players better off. We partially characterize the equilibrium. Its relation to other refinement concepts is also discussed. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 21
页数:21
相关论文
共 17 条
[1]   RENEGOTIATION AND SYMMETRY IN REPEATED GAMES [J].
ABREU, D ;
PEARCE, D ;
STACCHETTI, E .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 60 (02) :217-240
[2]   THE FOLK THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES - A NEU CONDITION [J].
ABREU, D ;
DUTTA, PK ;
SMITH, L .
ECONOMETRICA, 1994, 62 (04) :939-948
[3]  
ABREU D, 1989, UNPUB PERSPECTIVE RE
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1983, INTRO LAW EC
[5]   EXTENDING RENEGOTIATION-PROOFNESS TO INFINITE HORIZON GAMES [J].
ASHEIM, GB .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1991, 3 (03) :278-294
[6]   RENEGOTIATION IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES [J].
BENOIT, JP ;
KRISHNA, V .
ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (02) :303-323
[7]   EFFICIENCY AND RENEGOTIATION IN REPEATED GAMES [J].
BERGIN, J ;
MACLEOD, WB .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 61 (01) :42-73
[8]  
Bernheim B. D., 1989, Games and Economic Behavior, V1, P295, DOI DOI 10.1016/0899-8256(89)90020-1
[9]   ON RENEGOTIATION-PROOF EQUILIBRIUM UNDER IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].
CHEN, KP .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1995, 65 (02) :600-610
[10]   COALITIONS, LEADERSHIP, AND SOCIAL NORMS - THE POWER OF SUGGESTION IN GAMES [J].
DEMARZO, PM .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1992, 4 (01) :72-100