THE FOLK THEOREM FOR REPEATED GAMES - A NEU CONDITION

被引：71

作者：

ABREU, D

DUTTA, PK

SMITH, L

机构：

[1] UNIV WISCONSIN,DEPT ECON,MADISON,WI 53706

[2] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1994年 / 62卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2951739

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：939 / 948

页数：10

共 20 条

[1] TOWARD A THEORY OF DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING [J].

ABREU, D ;

PEARCE, D ;

STACCHETTI, E .

ECONOMETRICA, 1990, 58 (05) :1041-1063

[2] ON THE THEORY OF INFINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

ABREU, D .

ECONOMETRICA, 1988, 56 (02) :383-396

[3]

ABREU D, 1991, 294 U ROCH WORK PAP

[4] FINITELY REPEATED GAMES [J].

BENOIT, JP ;

KRISHNA, V .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (04) :905-922

[5]

DUTTA PK, 1991, IN PRESS J EC THEORY

[6] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J].

FRIEDMAN, JW .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1971, 38 (113) :1-12

[7] THE FOLK THEOREM IN REPEATED GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING OR WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

MASKIN, E .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (03) :533-554

[8] ON THE DISPENSABILITY OF PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION IN DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES [J].

FUDENBERG, D ;

MASKIN, E .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1991, 53 (02) :428-438

[9]

FUDENBERG D, 1989, UNPUB FOLK THEOREM I

[10] REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS OF PLAYERS [J].

KANDORI, M .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1992, 59 (01) :81-92

← 1 2 →