ON THE DISPENSABILITY OF PUBLIC RANDOMIZATION IN DISCOUNTED REPEATED GAMES

被引：74

作者：

FUDENBERG, D ^{[1
]}

MASKIN, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] HARVARD UNIV,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 53卷 / 02期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90163-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that any feasible, individually rational payoffs of an infinitely repeated game can arise as subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs if the discount factor is close enough to one even if mixed strategies are not observable and public randomizations are not available. © 1991.

引用

页码：428 / 438

页数：11

共 7 条

[1]

Aumann R., 1976, LONG TERM COMPETITIO

[2] NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUM FOR SUPERGAMES [J].