Copeland method .2. Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

被引:30
作者
Merlin, VR [1 ]
Saari, DG [1 ]
机构
[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV, DEPT MATH, EVANSTON, IL 60208 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.1996.2205
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n greater than or equal to 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are susceptible to these difficulties. For instance, we show for n = 3 candidates that the CM minimizes the negative aspects of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:148 / 172
页数:25
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