Reputation in auctions: Theory, and evidence from eBay

被引：297

作者：

Houser, D ^{[1
]}

Wooders, J

机构：

[1] George Mason Univ, Dept Econ, Interdisciplinary Ctr Econ Sci, Fairfax, VA 22030 USA

[2] Univ Arizona, Dept Econ, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2006年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00103.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.

引用

页码：353 / 369

页数：17

共 15 条

[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].