Cross-cultural differences in norm enforcement

被引:21
作者
Gächter, S
Herrmann, B
Thöni, C
机构
[1] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
[2] Univ St Gallen, Res Inst Empir Econ & Econ Policy, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland
关键词
D O I
10.1017/S0140525X05290143
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
We argue that the lack of large cross-cultural differences in many games with student subjects front developed countries may be due to the nature of the games studied. These games tap primarily basic psychological reactions, like fairness and reciprocity. Once we look at norm-enforcement, in particular punishment, we find large differences even among culturally rather homogeneous student groups from developed countries.
引用
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页码:822 / +
页数:9
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