Index Insurance for Developing Countries

被引:194
作者
Miranda, Mario J. [1 ]
Farrin, Katie [1 ]
机构
[1] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
YIELD CROP INSURANCE; MORAL HAZARD; ADVERSE SELECTION; SYSTEMIC RISK; CHEMICAL USE; MARKETS; DROUGHT; INDIA; ARRANGEMENTS; COMMITMENT;
D O I
10.1093/aepp/pps031
中图分类号
F3 [农业经济];
学科分类号
0202 ; 020205 ; 1203 ;
摘要
Unlike conventional insurance, which indemnifies policyholders for verifiable production losses arising from multiple perils, index insurance indemnifies policyholders based on the observed value of a specified index or some other closely related variable that is highly correlated with losses. Index insurance exhibits lower transaction costs than conventional insurance, potentially making it more affordable to the poor in the developing world. However, it also offers less effective individual risk protection. This article provides a review of recent theoretical and empirical research on index insurance for developing countries and summarizes lessons learned from index insurance projects implemented in the developing world since 2000.
引用
收藏
页码:391 / 427
页数:37
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