Toeholds and takeovers

被引:183
作者
Bulow, J [1 ]
Huang, M
Klemperer, P
机构
[1] Fed Trade Commiss, Washington, DC 20580 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[3] Univ Oxford Nuffield Coll, Oxford OX1 1NF, England
关键词
D O I
10.1086/250068
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Toeholds have an enormous impact in "common-value" takeover battles, such as those between two financial bidders. This contrasts with the small impact of a toehold in a "private-value" auction. Our results are consistent with empirical findings that a toehold helps a buyer win an auction, sometimes very cheaply. A controlling minority shareholder may therefore be effectively immune to outside offers. A target may benefit by requiring "best and final" sealed-bid offers or by selling a cheap toehold or options to a "white knight." Our analysis extends to regulators selling "stranded assets," creditors bidding in bankruptcy auctions, and so forth.
引用
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页码:427 / 454
页数:28
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